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FREE RIDER – A JUSTIFICATION FOR MANDATORY MEDICAL 
INSURANCE UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM? 
 




 Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 added 
section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code to require most individuals2 in the 
United States, beginning in the year 2014, to purchase an established minimum 
level of medical insurance. This requirement, which is enforced by a penalty 
imposed on those who fail to comply, is sometimes referred to as the “individual 
mandate.”3
 The individual mandate has proved to be controversial and has been the 
subject of a number of lawsuits contending that it is unconstitutional.
 The individual mandate is one element of a vast change that was made 
by Congress in 2010 to the provision of medical care.  
4 It is not our 
purpose in this article to discuss its constitutionality.5
                                                          
* Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
 Rather,  this piece focuses 
on the viability of one of the justifications that often is put forth for the adoption 
of the individual mandate. 
** Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. The authors would like to 
thank Professors Jill Horwitz, James Hines, Kyle Logue, and John Lopatka for 
their helpful comments and criticisms of this article. 
1 Public Law 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law 111-152, 124 Stat.1029 (2010). 
2 There are a number of categories of persons who are exempted from this 
mandate. See § 5000A(d)(2)-(4), (e) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
3 For an explanation of the operation of the individual mandate and an 
examination of the benefits and costs of the penalty that is employed to enforce it, 
see Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Individual Mandate, (to be published). 
4 ADD CITES. 
5 For a sample of those arguments, see Steven J, Eillis and Nakku Chung, 
Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169 (2010)(arguing 
that it is unconstitutional) and Brian D. Galle, Conditional Taxation and the 
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, YALE L.J. ONLINE (April 3, 
2010)(arguing that it is constitutional).  
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 A frequently stated defense of the individual mandate is that there are a 
vast number of persons who do not purchase medical insurance and then obtain 
free medical care when the need arises, and the individual mandate will require 
those persons (often referred to as “free-riders”) to pay their share. For example, 
after the State of Massachusetts adopted a similar medical welfare program, 
Governor Mitt Romney defended the inclusion of an individual mandate by 
saying,“someone has to pay for the health care that must, by law, be provided: 
Either the individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on the government is 
not libertarian.”6 This same justification has been advanced in briefs in defense of 
the program7
 It is the significance of this free-rider justification that we question. The 
medical welfare program that Congress adopted is not viable unless it includes an 
individual mandate or some comparable provision.
 and is often advanced in discussion of the merits of the program.  
8
                                                          
6 Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found a Way, The Wall Street 
Journal, April 11, 2006, p. A16. By “taxpayers,” Governor Romney means that 
the government pays when the individual does not. That is a bit of an 
overstatement. As we will see, only a small portion of the cost that is not borne by 
uninsured individuals is paid by the government. 
 The defense of the individual 
7 See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Economic Scholars in the case of  Thomas 
More Law Center, et al. v. Barack Hussein Obama, et al., currently pending in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Brief of the Amici 
Curiae in that case is hereinafter cited as “Amici Curiae Brief.” While the focus of 
those briefs is to show that the failure of persons to be insured affects interstate 
commerce so that the individual mandate is in compliance with the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution, the briefs also seek to show (albeit incidentally) that 
the 2010 Act is an appropriate response to the free-rider problem. For example, on 
page 16, the Amici Curiae Brief states, “The only economic solution to this 
dilemma [i.e., the free-rider problem] is to ensure broad participation in insurance 
pools by all people. The minimum coverage requirement is one way to do this.” 
8 The 2010 Act prohibits an insurer from denying insurance coverage to an 
applicant because of their poor health. Section 2705 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, supra n.1. That provision creates a potential free-rider 
problem. If there were not an individual mandate, large numbers of persons would 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 32 [2011]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art32
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784495
3 
 
mandate therefore is indirectly a defense of the entire program. So, it is worth 
considering whether the free-rider defense is valid since it bears on the 
determination of the merits of the entire program.  
As will be seen, we conclude that the free-rider problem, if it existed at all, 
likely was of minor significance and can hardly be said to justify the adoption of 
an intrusive and expensive health care program. The actual congressional reason 
for adopting the program seems to rest on an entirely different purpose, and the 
debate over the desirability of the program should focus on the merits of that other 
purpose.  
 The free-rider defense appears convincing until one examines it closely. 
An examination of the current situation and the manner in which the program 
operates shows that there are good reasons to doubt that there is much of a free-
rider problem and, if there is such a problem, that the 2010 Act does much to 
solve it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not purchase insurance until they had a medical condition. That adverse selection 
would make the premium cost of insurance prohibitive, and the program would 
fail either because either large numbers of persons could not afford the insurance 
or the insurance companies would exit the market. The question addressed in this 
article is whether and to what extent a free-rider problem existed before the 2010 
Act was adopted rather than whether the Act itself created one. It is our view that 
the introduction of the free-rider issue has prevented the debate over the merits of 
the program from focusing on the actual critical question of whether a 
redistribution of wealth from the young to the old and from the healthy to the 
unhealthy is an appropriate and desirable goal.  
 
In addition to the free-rider problem created by the Act, there is another reason 
why the individual mandate is necessary to make insurance affordable for the 
elderly. If the elderly were charged the actual actuarially determined cost of 
insuring them, the insurance would be too expensive for many to afford. To 
reduce their cost, it is necessary to force healthy young people to buy insurance 
and pay premiums in excess of the actual actuarial cost of their coverage so that 
they will subsidize the elderly. It is this redistribution of wealth that appears to be 
the actual purpose of the Act.  
3
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 There were approximately forty million persons in the United States. who 
were uninsured in 2007.9 Fifty-seven percent of those uninsured persons used 
medical services that year.10 The Amici Curiae Brief, citing a survey, states that, 
on average, the medical care costs of uninsured persons amounts to about $2,000 
per person each year, and over 1/3 of those costs are paid by the uninsured 
themselves out of their own finances.11 How is the rest of that cost financed? 
About one-half of the remaining cost is obtained by the providers’ increasing the 
price of medical services so that the shortfall is borne by those who pay for their 
treatment.12
 The Amici Curiae Brief states that fourteen percent of the cost of the 
uninsured is borne by the government through Medicare, Medicaid, services 
through the VA, TriCare (medical insurance for the military and their families) 
and workers’ compensation.
 The people who pay for that shortfall include those uninsured who 
pay for their own treatment.  
13 That statement needs some refinement.14
                                                          
9 See Amici Curiae Brief, n.12 and the text thereto. In light of the current 
economic situation, it is likely that the number of uninsured has increased since 
then. 
 Except for 
Medicaid, those are programs designed for specific purposes that have naught to 
do with whether the covered individuals would otherwise have private insurance. 
Indeed, it is unclear why people in those programs would be described as 
uninsured.  If the government bears a portion of the medical costs of the 
10 Id. 
11 Amici Curiae Brief, n. 28 and the text thereto. 
12 Id. at n. 29 states that 32% of the overall cost of the uninsured’s medical 
services is obtained by that means, and that translates to about one-half of the cost 
that the uninsured themselves do not pay. 
13 See the text of the Amici Curiae Brief following n. 31. 
14 Moreover, in the case of workers’ compensation, the government is really an 
agent distributing funds that were collected from employers. 
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uninsured, it is only through any additional price that the providers impose on all 
who purchase medical services. This is merely one aspect of the shifting of costs 
to those who pay for medical treatment. As to Medicaid, the recipients are persons 
who could not afford to purchase insurance; the government is not picking up the 
tab for shirkers who have failed to pay their share of medical expenses. 
 Who then are these people who are uninsured? The image left by those 
who advance the free-rider defense is that they are parasites who pass on their 
own medical costs to the rest of society by obtaining medical care without paying 
for it. They can avoid paying for insurance because they are assured that medical 
care will be provided without cost when they need it. To what extent does that 
image reflect reality?  
 Federal law requires that hospitals that take Medicare treat patients who 
come to their emergency rooms with emergency conditions regardless of whether 
those patients can pay for the treatment.15
                                                          
15 The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
 The hospitals are not required to 
provide free treatment if the patients have the means to pay for it. The hospitals 
can and do collect from such individuals. As previously noted, more than one-
third of the cost of treatments provided to uninsured patients is paid for by the 
uninsured patients themselves. It would seem that there are only two possible 
reasons why the medical providers do not collect the remaining two-thirds of that 
cost. One reason is that many of the patients do not have the means to make the 
payments. As to those who have the means but do not pay, that situation is 
attributable to the collection methods employed by the medical providers. In most 
5
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cases, it is likely that the reason for a failure to collect is that the amount involved 
is too small to justify the cost of pursuing collection. 
 Many of the persons who cannot afford the cost of their medical treatment 
could not afford to pay the premiums for medical insurance. As noted, the average 
cost of medical treatment to the uninsured is about $2,000 per person. Some will 
incur a larger expense, some less, and some not at all. The cost of insurance likely 
would exceed $2,000 per year,16 and so a significant percentage of those who do 
not pay the full cost of their treatment could not have afforded to purchase 
insurance either. Free-rider is not an apt description of persons in that 
predicament. Moreover, even if one is willing to describe such persons as free-
riders, their reliance on outside help is not eliminated by the adoption of the 2010 
Act. For taxable years after 2013, certain low and moderate income individuals 
who purchase insurance under a Health Insurance Exchange that the states are 
required to create will receive a refundable credit that subsidizes their purchase of 
that insurance.17 To qualify, the household income18 of the individual must at 
least equal the poverty level and must not exceed four times the poverty level for 
the family of the size involved.19
                                                          
16 In a letter to Senator Olivia Snow, the Director of the CBO stated that the CBO 
estimates that, in 2016, the annual premiums for a Bronze level plan under a 
Health Insurance Exchange program will average between $4,500 and $5,000 for 
an individual and between $12,000 and $12,500 for a family policy. The Bronze 
level will have the lowest premium of any of the four levels provided by the 
Exchange program.  
 The poverty level is determined by section 
17 § 36B of the Internal Revenue Code. 
18 The household income of an individual is the aggregate of the modified 
adjusted gross incomes of that individual and of all individuals for whom the 
taxpayer is allowed a dependent exemption deduction and who are required to file 
a federal income tax return. § 36B(d)(2). 
19 § 36B(c)(1)(A). There are additional requirements that must be satisfied. 
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2110(c)(5) of the Social Security Act.20 Currently, the poverty level for a single 
individual is $10,830, and so a single individual can have household income of as 
much as $43,320 and still qualify to have his insurance cost subsidized by the 
government.21 For a family of four, the current poverty level is $22,050, and so 
such a family can have household income as large as $88,200 and still qualify for 
a subsidy. Apparently, Congress felt that persons with income as high as those 
figures could not afford to purchase insurance without some financial 
assistance.22 That suggests that most of the persons with those incomes would not 
purchase insurance without a subsidy because they could not afford it.  Moreover, 
for such persons who purchase insurance at the silver coverage level,23 the federal 
government will pay the insurer to lower the individual’s co-pay element of the 
insurance.24
 As to persons in low and moderate income levels, and the amount of their 
income can be fairly high, the individual continues to be subsidized by others 
through the government’s grant of a refundable credit and paying part of the 
individual’s co-pay. If such persons are to have been considered free-riders before 
the passage of the 2010 Act, they would seem to still be such after the passage of 
  
                                                          
20 § 36B(d)(3). 
21 The amount of the government’s subsidization of premium costs is reduced in 
stages as the amount of the individual’s household income increases. 
22 Since the poverty level figures are adjusted each year to reflect inflation, the 
allowable income figures will be even higher in 2014 when these provisions first 
become effective. 
23 The Health Exchange programs will provide four levels of insurance coverage – 
the “bronze,” “silver,” “gold,” and “platinum” levels. 
24 Section 1402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra n. 1. 
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the Act. Moreover, many of the persons who cannot afford to purchase insurance 
are exempted from the individual mandate and so are not required to be insured.25
 Those uninsured persons who can afford to pay for their medical services 
and do not do so should be relatively few if the medical providers are diligent in 
collecting debts owed to them. If the medical providers are not diligent, and that 
seems unlikely, the proper cure is for them to improve their collection process 
rather than for the government to adopt an expensive and intrusive new medical 
care program. 
  
 It seems then that the pre-2010 free-rider problem is of minor consequence 
and played a very small part, if any, in the decision to adopt the insurance 
mandate. The two-fold reasons that the insurance mandate was adopted are: (1) to 
deal with the free-rider problem created by the Act’s requiring insurers to provide 
insurance regardless of the health of the applicant, and (2) to require young 
healthy persons to purchase insurance at a premium in excess of the actuarial cost 
of that coverage so that their payments will subsidize lower premiums for older or 
unhealthy insureds.26
                                                          
25 § 5000A(e)(1), (2), and (5). 
 It is ironic that the supporters of the insurance mandate 
complain that current uninsureds are passing on their medical costs to those who 
are insured when the health care program that supposedly cures that situation rests 
on allowing the elderly and unhealthy to pass on a portion of the cost of their 
26 Unmarried persons under the age of 26 may be covered by their parents’ 
insurance since group insurance plans are required to provide coverage for such 
adult children. Section 2714 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
supra n. 1. Those children will not need to purchase insurance until they cease to 
be covered by their parents’ plan. 
8




insurance coverage to the young and healthy. To quote a venerable adage, it 
would seem that what is sauce for the goose would be sauce for the gander. 
 The insurance mandate requires young healthy people who are not covered 
by their parents’ insurance to purchase insurance at a cost that is greater than the 
value that they receive. Although insurers are allowed to take the age of the 
insured into account in setting rates, they are restricted as to the amount of 
variance permitted among adults.27 The insured cannot take the health of the 
insured into account in setting a rate.28
 The Amici Curiae Brief
 
29
 The first point that the Brief makes is that by not buying insurance, the 
uninsured raise the cost of insurance for those who purchase it. The only reason 
that the uninsured’s acquisition of insurance would lower the premium cost of 
those who already purchase it is for the premiums charged to the uninsured to be 
greater than the actuarial cost of their insurance. The healthy are deemed to have 
caused an externality because they chose not to subsidize the medical expenses of 
 contends that even uninsureds who do not incur 
medical expenses increase the cost of health insurance for those who purchase it. 
That contention is intended to serve the dual purpose of showing an externality 
that affects interstate commerce and a justification for requiring nearly universal 
health insurance coverage. The Brief makes two points that purportedly 
demonstrate the correctness of that contention. Under scrutiny, neither of those 
points holds up well. 
                                                          
27 Section 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
supra n. 1, provides that the rate cannot vary by more than 3 to 1 for adults. 
28 Section 2701(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra n. 1. 
29 Supra  n. 7. 
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the unhealthy. It seems a strained characterization of that consequence to refer to 
it as an externality; but, if it is one, it is very different from the types of costs 
inflicted on others that ordinarily are referred to by that term  
 By way of comparison, consider the case of a group of persons who decide 
not to purchase an automobile and to rely instead on public transportation. If those 
persons had purchased automobiles, there would have been more workers 
employed by automobile manufacturers and dealers. It seems more than strange to 
say that their failure to buy an automobile imposed an externality on those 
workers who were thereby deprived of employment. Yet, that is the essential 
thrust of the contention that the failure of the healthy to purchase insurance 
imposed a cost on those who do purchase it. The circumstance of the healthy who 
do not purchase insurance is even further removed from causing an externality 
since the price of an automobile does not include a subsidy for others. 
 Moreover, the purchase of insurance by the uninsured may cause an 
increase in the demand for medical services that will result in an increase in the 
cost of those services and a resulting increase in the price of insurance. If persons 
who are currently uninsured purchase insurance, they are likely to increase their 
use of medical services. The increase in demand will cause a rise in the price 
charged for medical services, and that increase in price may well offset any 
reduction obtained by having a larger pool of insureds. 
 The Brief’s second point is that when people who refrained from buying 
insurance subsequently purchase it, studies show that they then incur larger 
medical care expenses than do those who were insured earlier in their life. The 
10




suggested reason for this is that the uninsured do not use preventive medical care 
that would lower their future medical costs. It would seem that the proper 
response to that situation is to permit the insurer to charge a larger premium to 
those who were previously uninsured for a period of time. If there is an 
externality here, it is caused by the failure of the insurer to charge the previously 
uninsured an actuarially accurate premium rather than by the uninsured’s decision 
not to purchase unneeded insurance. 
In conclusion, the 2010 Health Act is designed to redistribute wealth from 
the young and healthy to the elderly and ill. There are many governmental 
activities and requirements that cause a redistribution of wealth. There is much to 
be said in favor of that redistribution and much to be said against it. The 
discussion of the merits and negatives of the health program would more likely 
join issue, and thereby reach a sound conclusion, if the program were 
characterized honestly as a redistributive venture rather than to cloak it in the 
guise of a solution to a free-rider problem which has little or no significance. 
 The redistribution adopted in the 2010 Health Act is unusual in 
that it transfers wealth from the young to the old and from the healthy to the ill 
without regard to the income or wealth of either party except that the poor are 
excluded from both sides of that transfer.  
11
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